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1. Introduction1
The recent financial crisis has shown that, in order to stabilize markets,2
it is not enough to prohibit or to restrict short-selling. In fact:3
big speculators can influence badly the market and take huge advantage4
from arbitrage opportunities, caused by themselves.5
For nearly eight years from Jenuary 2001, Euro has had a upward trend6
versus the U.S. Dollar and in April 2008 Euro peaked out at 1.6 a U. S.7
Dollar. But after this date, Euro has declined by 17% until March 2012 (see8
the figure 1 [see also [13]]).9
Figure 1: U.S. Dollar-Euro exchange rate.
This decrease of the Euro value is due to the crisis that has hit the10
States of Euro-area and to the uncertain conditions of recovery of European11
economies. Moreover, the recent developments in the Greek crisis, which12
could lead to an exit of Greece from the Euro, certainly do not help the Euro13
against speculative attacks. So, a further decrease in the Euro value would14
make even more complicated the economic situation in Europe.15
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In this paper, by the introduction of a tax on financial transactions, we16
propose (using Game Theory [for a complete study of a game see [1, 2, 3,17
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]]) a method aiming to limit the Euro speculations18
of medium and big financial operators and, consequently, a way to make19
more stable the currency markets. Moreover, our aim is attained without20
inhibiting the possibilities of profits. At this purpose, we will present and21
study a natural and quite general normal form game - as a possible standard22
model of fair interaction between two financial operators - which gives to23
both players mutual economic advantages.24
As our first player we choose the Ferrari as an exemplary multinational25
enterprise. The Ferrari is a big economic subject that is famous through-26
out the world (everyone dreams to can drive a Ferrari car) and has a huge27
turnover. In fact, the Ferrari, despite being of Italian origin, is now estab-28
lished in all 5 continents of the Earth and is a multinational corporation in29
every respect. For this reason, the Ferrari is often exposed to currency risk.30
But the ordinary activities of the Ferrari is to sell luxury cars, not to act on31
the currency market paying attention to the fluctuations of the currency val-32
ues. So, taking in account only the 2010, the Ferrari has spent the pharaonic33
sum of 885 million Euros for the conclusion of derivative contracts for hedg-34
ing against currency risk (these data are readily available on the financial35
statements of the Ferrari).36
As our second player we choose the Unicredit Bank because it is one of the37
main financial institute of the world and it acts constantly on the financial38
markets.39
1.1. Financial preliminaries40
Here, we recall the financial concepts that we shall use in the present41
article.42
1)Any (positive) real number is a (proper) purchasing strategy ; a43
negative real number is a selling strategy.44
2) The spot market is the market where it is possible to buy and sell45
at current prices.46
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3) Futures are contracts between two parties to exchange, for a price47
agreed today, a specified quantity of the underlying commodity, at the expiry48
of the contract.49
4) In derivatives market there are three main categories of operators,50
depending on the purpose with which use the derivative contract: hedgers,51
speculators and arbitrageurs.52
4.1. Hedgers use forwards and futures to reduce the risks resulting53
from their exposures to market variables. Forward hedges eliminate the un-54
certainty on the price to pay for the purchase (or receivable for the sale) of55
the underlying asset, but not necessarily lead to a better result. The use of56
the derivative allows to neutralize the adverse trend of the market, offset-57
ting losses/gains on the price of the underlying asset with the gains/losses58
obtained on the derivatives market.59
4.2. Speculators realize investment strategies, buying (or selling) fu-60
tures and then sell (or buy) them at a price higher (or lower). Who decides61
to speculate assumes a risk about the favorable or unfavorable trend of the62
futures market. The futures market offers a financial leverage to speculators,63
which are able to take relatively large positions with a low initial outlay.64
4.3. Arbitrageurs take the offsetting positions of two or more contracts65
to lock in a risk-free profit, and take advantage of a price difference between66
two or more markets. The arbitrageurs exploit a temporary mismatch be-67
tween the performance (intended to coincide when the contract expires) of68
the futures market and the underlying market.69
5) A hedging operation through futures consists in purchase of futures70
contracts, in order to reduce exposure to specific risks on market variables71
(in this case on the price). In practice, the loss potential that is obtained72
on the spot market (the market at current prices) was offset by the gain on73
futures contracts.74
6) A hedging operation is said perfect when it completely eliminates the75
risk of the case.76
7) The futures price is linked to the underlying spot price. We assume77
that:78
7.1. the underlying commodity does not offer dividends;79
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7.2. the underlying commodity hasn’t storage costs and has not con-80
venience yield to take physical possession of the goods rather than futures81
contract.82
8)The general relationship linking the futures price Ft, with delivery time83
T , and spot price St, with sole interest capitalization at the time T , is Ft =84
Stu
T , where u = 1 + i is the capitalization factor of the futures and i the85
corresponding interest rate. If not, the arbitrageurs would act on the market86
until futures and spot prices return to levels indicated by the above relation.87
1.2. Methodologies88
The strategic game G, we propose for modeling our financial interaction,89
requires a construction on 3 times, say time 0, 1 and 2.90
0) At time 0, the Ferrari knows the quantity of his U. S. Dollar financial91
credits that derive from the sale of cars. It can choose to buy Euro futures92
contracts in order to hedge the currency risk on its no-Euro financial credits.93
1) At time 1, on the other hand, the Unicredit acts with speculative94
purposes on the currency spot markets (buying or short-selling Euros at95
time 0) and on the currency futures market (by the opposite action of that96
performed on the spot market). The Unicredit may so take advantage of the97
temporary misalignment of the Euro spot and futures prices (expressed in98
U.S. Dollars), created by the hedging strategy of the Ferrari.99
2) At the time 2, the Unicredit will cash or pay the sum determined by100
its behavior in the futures market at time 1.101
Remark. In this game, we suppose that the no-Euro credits of the102
Ferrari are U.S. Dollar credits, but this game theory model is also valid for103
any currency different from Euro (not only U.S. Dollars, but also yen for104
example). For this reason, the Ferrari should repeat the behaviors assumed105
in this model for any type of no-Euro credits that it has.106
Hereinafter U. S. Dollars are called simply Dollars.107
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2. The game and stabilizing proposal108
2.1. The description of the game109
We assume that our first player is the Ferrari spa, which chooses to110
buy Euro futures contracts to hedge against an upwards change of Euro-111
Dollar exchange rate; the Ferrari should cash a certain quantity of Dollar112
credits, which represent a quantity M1 of Euros that it would cash at time113
1 with the Euro-Dollar exchange rate of time 0. Therefore, the Ferrari can114
choose a strategy x ∈ [0, 1], representing the percentage of the quantity of115
the total EurosM1 that the Ferrari itself will purchase through Euro futures,116
depending on it wants:117
1) to not hedge, converting in Euros all the Dollar credits that it will118
cash at time 1 (x = 0);119
2) to hedge partially, buying Euro futures for a part of its Dollar credits120
that it will cash at time 1 and converting in Euros the rest (0 < x < 1);121
3) to hedge totally, buying Euro futures for all its Dollar credits (x = 1).122
On the other hand, our second player is the Unicredit bank operating123
on the Euro spot market. The Unicredit works in our game also on the Euro124
futures market:125
1) taking advantage of possible gain opportunities - given by misalign-126
ment between Euro spot and futures prices (both expressed in Dollars);127
2) or accounting for the loss obtained, because it has to close the position128
of short sales opened on the Euro spot market.129
These actions determine the payoff of the Unicredit. The Unicredit can130
therefore choose a strategy y ∈ [−1, 1], which represents the percentage of the131
quantity of Euros M2 that it can buy (in algebraic sense) with its financial132
resources, depending on it intends:133
1) to purchase Euros on the spot market (y > 0);134
2) to short sell Euros on the spot market (y < 0);135
3) to not intervene on the Euro spot market (y = 0).136
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the bi-strategy space E × F of the game.137
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Figure 2: The bi-strategy space of the game
2.2. The payoff function of the Ferrari138
The payoff function of the Ferrari, that is the function which represents139
quantitative relative gain of the Ferrari, referred to time 1, is given by the140
net gain obtained on not hedged Dollar credits expressed in Euros x′M1 (here141
x′ := 1− x). The gain related with the not hedged Dollar credits is given by142
the quantity of the not hedged Dollar credits expressed in Euros (1− x)M1,143
multiplied by the difference F0 − S1(y), between the Euro futures price at144
time 0 (the term F0) - which the Ferrari should pay, if it decides to hedge145
its Dollar credits - and the Euro spot price S1(y) at time 1, when the Ferrari146
actually buys Euros converting its Dollar credits that it did not hedge. So,147
the payoff function of the Ferrari is defined by148
f1(x, y) = F0M1x
′ − S1(y)M1x
′ = (F0 − S1(y))M1(1− x), (1)
for every bi-strategy (x, y) in E × F , where:149
1) M1 is the amount of Euros that the Ferrari should buy at time 1150
converting its Dollar credits by the exchange rate at time 0;151
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2) x′ = 1 − x is the percentage of the Euros that the Ferrari buys on152
the spot market at time 1, without any hedge (and therefore exposed to the153
fluctuations of Euro-Dollar exchange rate);154
3) F0 is the Euro futures price (expressed in Dollars) at time 0. It repre-155
sents the Euro price established at time 0 that the Ferrari has to pay at time156
1 in order to buy Euros. By definition, the futures price after (T − 0) time157
units is given by F0 = S0u
T , where u = 1+i is the (unit) capitalization factor158
with rate i. By i we mean the risk-free interest rate charged by banks on159
deposits of other banks, the so-called LIBOR rate. S0 is, on the other hand,160
the Euro spot price at time 0. S0 is constant because it is not influenced by161
our strategies x and y.162
4) S1(y) is the Euro spot price (expressed in Dollars) at time 1, after163
that the Unicredit has implemented its strategy y. It is given by S1(y) =164
S0u + nuy, where n is the marginal coefficient representing the effect of the165
strategy y on the price S1(y). The price function S1 depends on y because,166
if the Unicredit intervenes in the Euro spot market by a strategy y not equal167
to 0, then the Euro price S1 changes, since any demand change has an effect168
on the Euro-Dollar exchange rate. We are assuming linear the dependence169
n 7→ ny in S1. The value S0 and the value ny should be capitalized, because170
they should be transferred from time 0 to time 1.171
The payoff function of the Ferrari. Therefore, recalling the defini-172
tions of F0 and S1, the payoff function f1 of the Ferrari (from now on, the173
factor nu will be indicated by ν) is given by:174
f1(x, y) = −M1(1− x)νy = −M1(1− x)νy. (2)
2.3. The payoff function of the Unicredit175
The payoff function of the Unicredit at time 1, that is the algebraic gain176
function of the Unicredit at time 1, is the multiplication of the quantity of177
Euros bought on the spot market, that is yM2, by the difference between178
the Euro futures price F1(x, y) (it is a price established at time 1 but cashed179
at time 2) transferred to time 1, that is F1(x, y)u
−1, and the purchase price180
of Euros at time 0, say S0, capitalized at time 1 (in other words we are181
accounting for all balances at time 1).182
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2.3.1. Stabilizing strategy of normative authority.183
In order to avoid speculations on Euro spot and futures markets by the184
Unicredit, which in this model is the only one able to determine the Euro185
spot price (and consequently also the Euro futures price), we propose that186
the normative authority imposes to the Unicredit the payment of a tax on187
the sale of the Euro futures. So the Unicredit can’t take advantage of swings188
of Euro-Dollar exchange rate caused by itself. We assume that this tax is189
fairly equal to the incidence of the strategy of the Unicredit on the Euro190
spot price, so the price effectively cashed or paid for the Euro futures by191
the Unicredit is F1(x, y)u
−1− νy, where νy is the tax paid by the Unicredit,192
referred to time 1.193
Remark. We note that if the Unicredit wins, it acts on the Euro futures194
market at time 2 in order to cash the win, but also in case of loss it must195
necessarily act in the Euro futures market and account for its loss because196
at time 2 (in the Euro futures market) it should close the short-sale position197
opened on the Euro spot market.198
The payoff function of the Unicredit is defined by:199
f2(x, y) = yM2(F1(x, y)u
−1 − νy − S0u), (3)
where:200
(1) y is the percentage of Euros that the Unicredit purchases or sells on201
the spot market;202
(2) M2 is the maximum amount of Euros that the Unicredit can buy or203
sell on the spot market, according to its economic availability;204
(3) S0 is the price (expressed in Dollars) paid by the Unicredit in order to205
buy Euros. S0 is a constant because our strategies x and y do not influence206
it.207
(4) νy is the normative tax on the price of the Euro futures paid at time208
1. We are assuming that the tax is equal to the incidence of the strategy y209
of the Unicredit on the Euro price S1.210
(5) F1(x, y) is the Euro futures price (expressed in Dollars), established211
at time 1, after the Ferrari has played its strategy x. The function price212
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F1 is given by F1(x, y) = S1(y)u + mux, where u = 1 + i is the factor of213
capitalization of interests. By i we mean risk-free interest rate charged by214
banks on deposits of other banks, the so-called LIBOR rate. With m we215
intend the marginal coefficient that measures the influence of x on F1(x, y).216
The function F1 depends on x because, if the Ferrari buys Euro futures217
with a strategy x 6= 0, the price F1 changes because an increase of Euro218
futures demand influences the Euro futures price. The value S1 should be219
capitalized because it follows the fundamental relationship between futures220
and spot prices (see subsection 1.1, no. 7). The value mx is also capitalized221
because the strategy x is played at time 0 but has effect on the Euro futures222
price at time 1.223
(6) (1 + i)−1 is the discount factor. F1(x, y) must be translated at time224
1, because the money for the sale of Euro futures are cashed at time 2.225
The payoff function of the Unicredit. Recalling functions F1 and f2,226
we have227
f2(x, y) = yM2mx, (4)
for each (x, y) ∈ E × F .228
The payoff function of the game is so given, for every (x, y) ∈ E×F ,229
by:230
f(x, y) = (−νyM1(1− x), yM2mx). (5)
2.4. The payoff functions in presence of collaterals231
In this game we don’t consider the presence of collateral. But:232
• even if the price F0 will be paid at time 1, the Ferrari could deposit,233
already at time 0, the sum F0 as guarantee that (at the expiry) the234
contract will be respected.235
• even if the price F1 is paid at time 2, the Unicredit could deposit,236
already at time 1, the sum F1 as guarantee that (at the expiry) the237
contract will be respected.238
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Proposition 1. Let F0 be the Euro futures price at time 0 and let u :=239
(1 + i) be the capitalization factor. Then, the payoff function f c1 of the240
Ferrari, in presence of collateral, is the same of the payoff function f1 of the241
Ferrari without collateral.242
Proof. In order to calculate the win of the Ferrari at the time 1, we recall243
its payoff function (see the Eq.(2))244
f1(x, y) = −νyM1(1− x).
In presence of collaterals, at the sum F0 (that is paid as collateral at time 0245
and for this reason it has to be capitalized) must be subtracted the interests246
F0i, cashed by the Ferrari on the deposit of collateral.247
So, in the payoff function f1 of the Ferrari we have to put the value248
F0u− F0i (6)
in place of the futures price F0.249
We will show that the value obtained in the Eq. (6) is equal to the value250
in place of which must be replaced, that is the Euro futures price F0. So we251
want show that252
F0u− F0i = F0.
Recalling that u := (1 + i), we have253
F0(1 + i)− F0i = F0.
This completes the proof. 254
Remark. So we have shown that, in presence of collaterals, the payoff255
function f1 of the Ferrari that we have found before without considering256
eventual collateral, results valid also with guarantee deposits.257
Proposition 2. Let
F1(x, y) = S1(y)u+mux
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be the Euro futures price at time 0 and let u := (1 + i) be the capitalization258
factor. Then, the payoff function f c2 of the Unicredit, in presence of collat-259
eral, is the same of the payoff function f2 of the Unicredit without collateral.260
Proof. In order to calculate the win of the Unicredit at the time 1, we261
recall its payoff function (see the Eq.(4))262
f2(x, y) = yM2mx.
In presence of collaterals, at the value F1 (that is paid as collateral at time263
1) we must subtract the interests (actualized at time 1) on the deposit of264
collateral cashed at time 2 by the Unicredit.265
The interests cashed by the Unicredit are given by266
F1(x, y)iu
−1.
So, in the payoff function f2 of the Unicredit we have to put the value267
F1(x, y)− F1(x, y)iu
−1 (7)
in place of the Euro futures price actualized F1u
−1.268
We will show that the value obtained in the Eq. (7) is equal to the value269
in place of which must be replaced, that is the Euro futures price actualized270
F1(x, y)u
−1. So we want show that271
F1(x, y)− F1(x, y)iu
−1 = F1(x, y)u
−1.
Recalling that272
F1(x, y) = S1(y)u+mux,
we obtain273
S1(y)u+mux− (S1(y) +mx)uu
−1i = (S1(y)u+mux)u
−1,
and therefore274
S1(y)u+mux− (S1(y) +mx)i = S1(y) +mx.
Recalling that u = (1 + i), we have275
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S1(y)(1 + i) +mx(1 + i)− S1(y)i+mxi = S1(y) +mx.
This completes the proof. 276
Remark. So we have shown that, in presence of collaterals, the payoff277
function of the Unicredit that we have found before without considering278
eventual collateral, results valid also with guarantee deposits.279
3. Study of the game280
3.1. Critical space of the game281
Since we are dealing with a non-linear game it is necessary to study in282
the bi-win space also the points of the critical zone, which belong to the283
bi-strategy space. In order to find the critical area of the game we consider284
the Jacobian matrix and we put its determinant equal 0.285
For what concern the gradients of f1 and f2, we have286
∇ f1 = (M1yν,−νM1(1− x))
∇ f2 = (M2my,M2mx).
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is287
det Jf(x,y) =M1M2νymx+M1M2m(1− x)νy.
Therefore the critical space of the game is288
Zf = {(x, y) :M1M2νymx+M1M2m(1− x)νy = 0}.
Dividing by M1M2νm, which are all positive numbers (strictly greater than289
0), we have:290
Zf = {(x, y) : yx+ (1− x)y = 0}.
Finally we have
Zf = {(x, y) : y = 0}.
The critical area of our bi-strategy space is represented in the figure 3 by291
the segment [H,K].292
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Figure 3: The critical space of the game
3.2. Payoff space293
In order to represent graphically the payoff space f(E×F ), we transform,294
by the function f , all the sides of bi-strategy rectangle E×F and the critical295
space Z of the game G.296
1) The segment [A,B] is the set of all the bi-strategies (x, y) such that297
y = 1 and x ∈ [0, 1].298
Calculating the image of the generic point (x, 1), we have f(x, 1) =299
(M1[−ν(1− x)],M2mx).300
Therefore setting X = M1[−ν(1 − x)] and Y = M2mx, and assuming301
M1 = 1,M2 = 2, and ν = m = 1/2, we have X = −(1/2)(1− x) and Y = x.302
Replacing Y instead of x, we obtain the image of the segment [A,B],303
defined as the set of the bi-wins (X, Y ) such that X = −(1/2)(1 − Y ) =304
−1/2 + Y and Y ∈ [0, 1/2].305
It is a line segment with extremes A′ = f(A) and B′ = f(B).306
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Following the procedure described above for the other side of the bi-307
strategy rectangle and for the critical space, that are the segments [B,C],308
[C,D], [D,A] and [H,K], we get the figures 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 on the payoff309
space f(E × F ) of our game G.310
Figure 4: The payoff space of the game G
We can see how the set of possible winning combinations of the two311
players took a curious butterfly shape that promises the game particularly312
interesting.313
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Figure 5: The payoff space of the game G
Figure 6: The payoff space of the game G
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Figure 7: The payoff space of the game G
Figure 8: The payoff space of the game G
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4. Study of the game and equilibria314
4.1. Friendly phase315
The superior extremum of the game, that is the bi-win α = (1/2, 1), is a
shadow maximum because it doesn’t belong to the payoff space:
α = (1/2, 1) /∈ f(E × F ).
The infimum of the game, that is the bi-win β = (−1/2,−1), is a shadow
minimum because it doesn’t belong to the payoff space:
β = (−1/2,−1) /∈ f(E × F ).
The weak maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space is [B′K ′]∪[H ′D′].316
The weak maximal Pareto boundary of the bi-strategic space is the retro-317
image of the weak maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space, is [BK] ∪318
[HD] ∪ [HK].319
The proper maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space is represented320
by ∂∗f(E × F ) = {B′, D′}. The proper maximal Pareto boundary of the bi-321
strategic space is the reciprocal image of the proper maximal Pareto bound-322
ary of the payoff space, is ∂∗f(E × F ) = {B,D}.323
The weak minimal Pareto boundary of the payoff space is [A′H ′]∪ [K ′C ′].324
The weak minimal Pareto boundary of the bi-strategy space is the reciprocal325
image of the weak minimal Pareto boundary of the payoff space, is [AH ] ∪326
[KC] ∪ [HK].327
The proper minimal Pareto boundary of the payoff space is represented328
by ∂∗f(E × F ) = {A
′, C ′}. The proper minimal Pareto boundary of the bi-329
strategy space is the reciprocal image of the proper minimal Pareto boundary330
of the payoff space, is ∂∗f(E × F ) = {A,C}.331
In the figure 9 we show graphically the previous considerations.332
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Figure 9: Pareto boundaries and extrema of the game
Control and accessibility of non-cooperative Pareto boundaries.333
Definition of Pareto control. The Ferrari can cause a Pareto bi-strategy x0334
if exists a strategy such that for every strategy y of the Unicredit the pair335
(x0, y) is a Pareto pair.336
In this regard, in our game there are no maximal Pareto controls, nor337
minimal. So neither player can decide to go on the Pareto boundary without338
cooperation with the other one. The game promises to be quite complex to339
resolve in a satisfactory way for both players.340
4.2. Nash equilibria341
If the two players decide to adopt a selfish behavior, they choose their342
own strategy maximizing their partial gain. In this case, we should consider343
the classic Nash best reply correspondences.344
The best reply correspondence of the Ferrari is the correspondence B1 :345
F → E given by y 7→ maxf1(·,y)E, where maxf1(·,y)E is the set of all strategies346
in E which maximize the section f1(·, y).347
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Symmetrically, the best reply correspondence B2 : E → F of the Uni-348
credit is given by x 7→ maxf2(x,·) F .349
Choosing M1 = 1, ν = 1/2, M2 = 2 and m = 1/2, which are positive
numbers (strictly greater than 0), and recalling that f1(x, y) = −M1νy(1−x),
we have ∂1f1(x, y) =M1νy, this derivative has the same sign of y, and so:
B1(y) =


{1} if y > 0
E if y = 0
{0} if y < 0
.
Recalling that f2(x, y) = M2mxy, we have ∂2f2(x, y) = M2mx and so:350
B2(x) = {1} if x > 0 and B2(x) = F if x = 0.351
In Fig.10 we have in red the inverse graph of B1, and in blue that one of352
B2.353
Figure 10: Nash equilibria
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The set of Nash equilibria, that is the intersection of the two best354
reply graphs (graph of B2 and the symmetric of B1), is {(1, 1)} ∪ [H,D].355
Analysis of Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibria can be considered356
quite good, because they are on the weak maximal Pareto boundary. It357
is clear that if the two players pursue the profit, and choose their selfish358
strategies to obtain the maximum possible win, they arrive on the weak359
maximal boundary. The selfishness, in this case, pays well. This purely360
mechanical examination, however, leaves us unsatisfied. The Ferrari has361
two Nash possible alternatives: not to hedge, playing 0, or to hedge totally,362
playing 1. Playing 0 it could both to win or lose, depending on the strategy363
played by the Unicredit; opting instead for 1, the Ferrari guarantee to himself364
to leave the game without any loss and without any win.365
Analysis of possible Nash strategies. If the Ferrari adopts a strategy366
x 6= 0, the Unicredit plays the strategy 1 winning something, or else if the367
Ferrari plays 0 the Unicredit can play all its strategy set F , indiscriminately,368
without obtaining any win or loss. These considerations lead us to believe369
that the Unicredit will play 1, in order to try to win at least “something”,370
because if the Ferrari plays 0, its strategy y does not affect its win. The371
Ferrari, which knows that the Unicredit very likely chooses the strategy 1, will372
hedge playing the strategy 1. So, despite the Nash equilibria are infinite, it is373
likely the two players arrive in B = (1, 1), which is part of the proper maximal374
Pareto boundary. Nash is a viable, feasible and satisfactory solution, at least375
for one of two players, presumably the Unicredit.376
4.3. Defensive phase377
We suppose that the two players are aware of the will of the other one378
to destroy it economically, or are by their nature cautious, fearful, paranoid,379
pessimistic or risk averse, and then they choose the strategy that allows them380
to minimize their loss. In this case, we talk about defensive strategies.381
Conservative value and meetings. Conservative value of a player. It382
is defined as the maximization of its function of worst win. Therefore, the383
conservative value of the Ferrari is v♯1 = supx∈E f
♯
1(x), where f
♯
1 is the function384
of worst win of the Ferrari, and it is given by f ♯1(x) = infy∈F f1(x, y), for every385
x in E.386
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Recalling the Eq. (2), that is f1(x, y) = M1[−νy(1 − x)], and choosing387
M1 = 1, ν = 0.5, M2 = 2 and m = 0.5, which are always positive numbers388
(strictly greater than 0), we have:389
f ♯1 = inf
y∈F
M1[−νy(1− x)].
Therefore since the offensive strategies of the Unicredit are O2(x) ={
{1} if 0 ≤ x < 1
{F} if x = 1
, we obtain:
f ♯1(x) =
{
{M1[−ν(1− x)]} if 0 ≤ x < 1
{0} if x = 1
.
In the figure 11 f ♯1 appears graphically.390
Figure 11: Graphical representation of f ♯
1
, the function of worst win of the Ferrari.
So the defense (or conservative) strategy of the Ferrari is given by391
x♯ = 1
and the conservative value of the Ferrari is392
v♯1 = sup
x∈E
inf
y∈F
M1[−νy(1− x)] = 0. (8)
On the other hand, the conservative value of the Unicredit is given by393
v♯2 = supy∈F f
♯
2, where f
♯
2 is the function of the worst win of the Unicredit. It394
is given by f ♯2(y) = infx∈E f2(x, y), for every y ∈ F .395
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Recalling the Eq. (4), that is396
f2(x, y) =M2mxy,
and choosing M1 = 1, ν = 0.5,M2 = 2 and m = 0.5, which are always397
positive numbers (strictly greater than 0), we have:398
f ♯2 = inf
x∈E
M2mxy.
Therefore since the offensive strategies of the Ferrari areO1(y) =


{0} if y > 0
{E} if y = 0
{1} if y < 0
,
we obtain:
f ♯2(y) =
{
{0} if y ≥ 0
{M2my} if y < 0
.
In the figure 12 f ♯2(y) appears graphically.399
Figure 12: Graphical representation of f ♯
2
, the function of worst win of the Unicredit.
So the defense (or conservative) strategy of the Unicredit is given by400
y♯ = [0, 1]
and the conservative value of the Unicredit is401
v♯2 = sup
y∈F
inf
x∈E
M2mxy = 0. (9)
Therefore the conservative bi-value is402
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v♯f = (v
♯
1, v
♯
2) = (0, 0).
Conservative meetings. They are represented by the bi-strategies403
(x♯, y♯), that are represented by the whole segment [B,K]. If the Ferrari404
and the Unicredit decides to defend themselves against any opponent’s of-405
fensive strategies, they arrive on the payoffs subset [B′, K ′], which is part406
of the weak maximal Pareto boundary. B′ is even a point on the proper407
maximal boundary, while K ′ is also part of the weak minimal one. In this408
simplified model, although there is the possibility that the Unicredit decides409
not to act on the market, obtaining in this way no profit and arriving in K ′,410
the Unicredit presumably will choose the defensive strategy y♯ = 1, because411
it’s the only one that allows him to obtain the maximum possible profit (be-412
ing able anyway not to incur losses). In this case the players arrive in B′,413
the optimal solution for the Unicredit. This happens because the Ferrari was414
unable with its strategies x ∈ [0, 1] to lead to a lowering of the Euro futures415
price.416
Remark. In reality, however, in addiction to the Ferrari there are other417
traders, which could also cause a fall in futures prices and then, if the Uni-418
credit would choose a defensive strategy, presumably it would decide to not419
act on the market with y♯ = 0. In this case, the conservative meeting would420
be only one, i.e. K = (1, 0).421
4.3.1. Core and conservative parts of the game422
Core of the payoff space. The core is the part of the maximal Pareto423
boundary contained in the upper cone of the payoff424
v♯f = (v
♯
1, v
♯
2) = (0, 0).
Therefore we have425
core′(G) = [B′K ′] ∪ [H ′D′],
whose reciprocal image is426
core(G) = [BK] ∪ [HD] ∪ [HK].
In the figure 13 we can see graphically in red the part of the payoff space427
where the Ferrari would has a win greater than its conservative value v♯1 = 0428
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(x-axis in pink). On the other hand, in blue is shown the part of the payoff429
space where the Unicredit obtains a win higher than its conservative value430
v♯2 = 0 (y-axis in blue).431
Figure 13: Core and conservative parts on the payoff space.
We note that if both players choose their conservative strategies x♯ = 1 e432
y♯ = [0, 1], the Ferrari avoids to lose more of its conservative value v
♯
1 = 0 but433
is automatically unable to get also higher wins. The same discourse does not434
apply to the Unicredit that may arrive on the segment [B′K ′]. The game is435
in substance blocked for the Ferrari, that is clearly disadvantaged in respect436
of the Unicredit.437
Remark. Recalling the previous remark (see the previous page 12), the438
game would be blocked for both, with the Unicredit also unable to get higher439
wins to its conservative value v♯2 = 0 if it decides to play its defensive strategy440
y♯ = 0.441
Conservative part of the game on the bi-strategy space. It is the442
set of the pairs (x, y) such that443
f1(x) ≥ v
♯
1 ∧ f2(y) ≥ v
♯
2.
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Recalling the Eq. (2), that is444
f1(x, y) =M1[−νy(1− x)],
and the Eq. (8), that is v♯1 = 0, the conservative part of the Ferrari on445
the bi-strategy space is given by446
(E × F )♯1 =M1[−νy(1− x)] ≥ 0,
which developed becomes447
−νM1y ≤ 0 ∨ x ≤ 1 or − νM1y ≥ 0 ∨ x ≥ 1.
ChoosingM1 = 1 and ν = 0.5, which are always positive numbers (strictly448
greater than 0), we obtain the figure 14.449
Figure 14: Conservative part of the Ferrari (in red) on the bi-strategy space.
Now talk about the Unicredit. Recalling the Eq. (4), that is450
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f2(x, y) =M2mxy,
and the Eq. (9), that is v♯2 = 0, the conservative part of the Unicredit on451
the bi-strategy space is given by452
(E × F )♯2 =M2mxy ≥ 0.
Choosing M2 = 2 and m = 0.5, which are always positive numbers453
(strictly greater than 0), we obtain the figure 15.454
Figure 15: Conservative part of the Unicredit (in light blue) on the bi-strategy space.
Then intersecting the graph of the conservative part (we are talking about455
the bi-strategy space) of the Ferrari (player 1) and the conservative part of456
the Unicredit (player 2), we have the conservative part of the game in the457
bi-strategy space.458
It is given by the intersection459
(E × F )♯ = (E × F )♯1 ∧ (E × F )
♯
2,
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and, then460
(E × F )♯ =M1[−νy(1− x)] ≥ 0 ∧M2mxy ≥ 0.
We observe the graphical result in the figure 16, where the conservative461
part is easily seen to be a union of three line segments (shown in yellow);462
this situation was, in any case, quite evident also from the analysis of the463
figure 13 (representing the transformation of the Core of the game and the464
conservative parts in the payoff space).465
We remark, moreover, that this conservative part coincides with the weak466
Pareto boundary of the game, that is the set of all bi-strategies which are467
not strongly dominated by other bi-strategies of the game: ∂∗wG ={(x,y):468
does not exist (u, v) in E×F such that f(x, y) << f(u, v)}, where w << w′469
means that both components of w are strictly less than the corresponding470
components of w′.471
Let us present, now, the figure 16.472
Figure 16: Conservative part of the game (in yellow) on the bi-strategy space.
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We see easily that the conservative part of the game, on the bi-strategy473
space, is given by474
(E × F )♯ = [BK] ∪ [KH ] ∪ [HD].
4.3.2. Conservative knots of the game475
Conservative knots. They are, by definition, the strategy pairs (x, y) such476
that477
f1(x, y) = v
♯
1 and f2(x, y) = v
♯
2,
that is those bi-strategies whose images coincide with the conservative bi-478
value.479
And therefore, recalling the Eq. (2), that is480
f1(x, y) =M1[−νy(1− x)],
and the Eq. (8), that is v♯1 = 0, any conservative knot verifies the equa-481
tion:482
M1[−νy(1− x)] = 0.
Solving the equation, we obtain M1νy = 0 and 1− x = 0.483
Choosing M1, e ν, which are always positive numbers (strictly greater484
than 0), we have:485
y = 0 or x = 1.
Recalling also the Eq. (4), that is486
f2(x, y) =M2mxy,
and the Eq. (9), that is v♯2 = 0, we have:487
M2mxy = 0.
Choosing M2 and m, which are always positive numbers (strictly greater488
than 0), we have:489
x = 0 or y = 0.
Therefore, as we can see in the figure 17, every point (x, 0) of the bi-490
strategy space, i.e. the segment [H,K], is a conservative knot.491
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Figure 17: Conservative knots
4.4. Offensive equilibria492
If the two players want to think only to ruin the other one, would choose493
the strategy that makes maximum the loss of the other one. In this case it494
is nec-essary to talk about multifunction of worst offense.495
The multifunction of worst offense of the Ferrari against the Unicredit is
the correspondence
O1 : F → E : y 7→ min
f2(·,y)
E
where minf2(·,y) is the set of all strategies in E that minimize the section496
f2(·, y)).497
On the other hand, the multifunction of worst offense of the Unicredit498
against the Ferrari is:499
O2 : E → F : x 7→ min
f1(x,·)
F.
In practice, in order to find O1 we try the value of x that minimizes f2;500
in order to find O2 we try the value of y that minimize f1.501
Recalling the Eq. (2), that is502
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f1(x, y) =M1[−νy(1− x)],
we have
O2(x) =
{
{1} if 0 ≤ x < 1
{F} if x = 1
.
Recalling also the Eq. (4), that is503
f2(x, y) =M2mxy,
we have504
O1(y) =


{0} if y > 0
{E} if y = 0
{1} if y < 0
.
We observe in the figure 18 the graphs of O2 (in blue) and of O1 (in red).505
Figure 18: Offensive equilibria
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The set of offensive equilibria, that is the intersection of the two worst506
offense graphs (graph of O2 and the symmetric of O1), is507
Eq(O1, O2) = {(0, 1)} ∪ [KC].
Analysis of offensive equilibria. The offensive equilibria may be con-508
sidered bad because they are on the weak minimal Pareto boundary (indeed509
the point K ′ is also part of the weak maximal boundary). In addition, among510
the offensive equilibria there are also the two points that represent the proper511
minimal Pareto boundary, i.e. {A′, C ′}. It is clear that if the two players512
want to attack the other one, and decide to choose their strategy just to spite513
the other player, they arrive on the weak minimal Pareto boundary.514
Analysis of possible offensive strategies. Probably the Unicredit515
plays the strategy y = 1 because it is the only one able to maximize the516
damage of the Ferrari if it plays x 6= 1, while if the Ferrari chooses the517
strategy x = 1, the choice of strategy by the Unicredit is indifferent about518
the damage (zero) procured to the Ferrari.519
On the other hand, knowing that the Unicredit chooses the strategy y = 1520
to try to hurt it, the Ferrari most likely chooses x = 0 to be sure that the521
Unicredit gets the minimum possible win (which, in this case, is equal to 0).522
So, despite the offensive equilibria are infinite, the two players most likely523
arrive in A = (0, 1), which is on the proper minimal Pareto boundary: the524
offensive strategies of both players can be considered a credible threat. We525
want to highlight as very likely even if the Ferrari plays its offensive strategies,526
in our game, however, the Unicredit will not lose.527
4.5. Equilibria of devotion528
In the event that the two players wanted to “do good” to the other one,529
they would choose its strategy that maximizes the payoff of the other one.530
In this case is necessary to talk about multifunction of devotion.531
The multifunction of devotion of the Ferrari is the correspondence
L1 : F → E : y 7→ max
f2(·,y)
E,
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where maxf2(·,y) is the set of all strategies of the Ferrari that maximize the532
section f2(·, y)).533
Symmetrically, the multifunction of devotion L2 : E → F of the Unicredit534
is given by x 7→ maxf1(x,·) F .535
In practice, in order to find L1 we try the value of x that maximizes f2;536
in order to find L2 we try the value of y that maximize f1.537
ChoosingM1 = 1 and ν = 0.5, which are always positive numbers (strictly538
greater than 0) and recalling the Eq. (2), that is539
f1(x, y) =M1[−νy(1− x)],
we have:
L2(x) =
{
{−1} if 0 ≤ x < 1
{F} if x = 1
.
Recalling also the Eq. (4), that is540
f2(x, y) =M2mxy,
and choosing M2 = 2 and m = 0.5, which are always positive numbers541
(strictly greater than 0), we have542
L1(y) =


{1} if y > 0
{E} if y = 0
{0} if y < 0
.
In the figure 19 we illustrate in red the inverse graph of L1(y) and in blue543
that one of L2(x).544
33
Figure 19: Equilibria of devotion
The set of equilibria of devotion is545
Eq(L1, L2) = {(0,−1)} ∪ [BK].
Analysis of devotion equilibria. The equilibria of devotion can be546
considered good because they are on the weak maximal Pareto boundary547
(indeed the point K’ is also part of the weak minimal boundary). Also548
among the devote equilibria there are even the two the points that represent549
the proper maximal Pareto boundary, i.e. {B′, D′}.550
It is clear that if both players ignore their good and decide to choose their551
strategy selflessly so that the other one has the maximum possible win, they552
arrive on the weak maximal Pareto boundary.553
Analysis of possible devotion strategies. The Unicredit probably554
plays the strategy y = −1 because it is the only one able to maximize the555
win of the Ferrari if it plays x 6= 1, while if the Ferrari chooses the strategy556
x = 1, the choice of strategy of the Unicredit is indifferent about the win557
(equal to 0) of the Ferrari.558
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On the other hand, the Ferrari, knowing that the Unicredit chooses the559
strategy y = −1 in order to help it, most likely chooses x = 0. So the560
Unicredit gets the highest possible win, which in this case is equal to 0. We561
can see that although the equilibria of devotion are infinite, the two players562
most likely arrive in D = (0,−1), which is on the proper maximal Pareto563
boundary.564
In case of devote strategies adopted by the Unicredit, most likely the565
Ferrari manages to win the maximum possible sum, while it is not the same566
for the Unicredit.567
4.6. Cooperative solutions568
The best way for the two players to get both a gain is to find a cooperative569
solution. One way would be to divide the maximum collective profit,570
determined by the maximum of the collective gain functional g, defined by571
g(X, Y ) = X + Y , on the payoffs space of the game G, i.e the profit W =572
maxf(E×F ) g. The maximum collective profit W is attained at the point B
′,573
which is the only bi-win belonging to the straight line g−1(1) (with equation574
g = 1) and to the payoff space f(E × F ). So, the Ferrari and the Unicredit575
play (1, 1), in order to arrive at the payoff B′. Then, they split the obtained576
bi-gain B′ by means of a contract.577
Financial point of view. The Ferrari buys futures to create artificially a578
misalignment between futures and spot prices; misalignment that is exploited579
by the Unicredit, which get the maximum win W = 1.580
For a possible fair division of W = 1, we employ a transferable utility581
solution: finding on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the payoff582
space a non-standard Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (non-standard because we583
do not consider the whole game, but only its maximal Pareto boundary).584
We find the supremum of maximal boundary,
sup ∂∗f(E × F ),
which is the point α = (1/2, 1), and we join it with the infimum of maximal
Pareto boundary,
inf ∂∗f(E × F ),
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which is (0, 0).585
We note that the infimum of our maximal Pareto boundary is equal to586
v♯ = (0, 0) (the conservative bi-gain of the game).587
The intersection point P , between the straight line of maximum collective588
win (i.e. (g = 1)) and the straight line joining the supremum of the maximal589
Pareto boundary with its infimum (i.e., the line Y = 2X) is the desirable590
division of the maximum collective win W = 1 between the two players. The591
figure 20 shows the situation.592
The point P = (1/3, 2/3) suggests that the Ferrari should receive 1/3, by593
contract, from the Unicredit, while at the Unicredit remains the win 2/3.594
Figure 20: Transferable utility solution: cooperative solution
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5. Conclusions595
The games just studied suggests a possible regulatory model providing596
the stabilization of the currency market through the introduction of a tax597
on currency transactions. In fact, in this way, it could be possible to avoid598
speculative attacks against the Euro, speculative attacks which constantly599
affect modern economy. The Unicredit could equally gains without burdening600
on the financial system by unilateral manipulations of currency exchange601
rate.602
The unique optimal solution is the cooperative one above exposed, oth-603
erwise the game appears like a sort of “your death, my life”. This type of604
situation happens often in the economic competition and leaves no escapes605
if either player decides to work alone, without a mutual collaboration. In606
fact, all non-cooperative solutions lead dramatically to mediocre results for607
at least one of the two players.608
Now it is possible to provide an interesting key in order to understand the609
conclusions which we reached using the transferable utility solution. Since610
the point B = (1, 1) is also the most likely Nash equilibrium, the number 1/3611
(that the Unicredit pays by contract to the Ferrari) can be seen as the fair612
price paid by the Unicredit to be sure that the Ferrari chooses the strategy613
x = 1, so they arrive effectively to more likely Nash equilibrium B = (1, 1),614
which is also the optimal solution for the Unicredit.615
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